ABSTRACT Cloud computing is the next major paradigm shift in information and communication technology. Today, data center (DC) is pivotal to the effective implementation of the cloud computing paradigm. To deliver the necessary cloud services, the DC faces major reliability and robustness challenges. In this study, we concentrate upon the efficient DC resource allocation technique by considering the synergy of the performance and energy efficiency. To achieve the maximum system efficiency, thermal-aware control mechanism is developed based on the dual-level cooperative game. Proactively, we adaptively assign the workload among different servers using the concept of relative utilitarian bargaining solution. Reactively, we maintain a thermal equilibrium according to the characteristics of τ -value. The main advantage of our dual-level game model is to provide an axiom-based strategic solution for the DC resource allocation problem while dynamically responding to the current workload and thermal conditions. The effectiveness of our proposed protocol is verified through simulation evaluations under different workload scenarios. Results demonstrate that the proposed approach significantly outperforms the existing state-of-the-art DC control schemes from energy consumption and load balancing perspectives. Last, some open problems are identified and we summarize possible research issues for the future study.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the confluence of two powerful global trends -the rapid growth of cloud computing and big data processing -has gained special attention from both academia and research community. Big data based cloud service has shown its great potential in unearthing valuable insights of big data to improve decision-making, minimize risk and develop new products and services. Internet companies, such as Google, Microsoft, and Amazon, are providing an expanding range of big data related services, including computing, storage, searching, content-delivery, online-shopping, and social networking. However, these services are so massive and complex that it is difficult to be explicitly represented,
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Data center (DC) is a dedicated space, which is used to house computer servers and associated components, such as telecommunications and storage systems. As a cost-effective platform, the DC may enjoy economies of scale by amortizing long-term capital investments over a considerable number of machines. It is estimated that the DC market is expected to grow from USD 15.79 Billion in 2015 to USD 56.05 Billion by 2020, at a compound annual growth rate of 29 percent. Generally, the DC consists of multiple servers, which are stacked in racks and connected with one another by a hierarchical network structure. Therefore, many high performance computing clusters have been implemented to process tasks in the DC infrastructure. In this manner, the servers in the cluster, called nodes, operate together to provide redundancy and load balancing within the DC while ensuring a higher level availability for the DC operations [4] , [5] .
The demand for DC capacity grew tremendously, while total DC energy consumption grew extremely; it's no secret that DCs consume a huge amount of energy at an unprecedented pace. From 2005-2010, the energy used by DCs increased by 36 percent in US and 56 percent worldwide, accounting for 2 percent and 1.3 percent of total electricity use, respectively. Specifically, DCs' energy consumption surpassed 237 billion kWh/year worldwide and 76 billion kWh/year in the US in 2010. The energy consumption is expected to increase continually during the coming years, and it is predicting that a global annual DC construction size for 2020 will be $78 billion. For example, the energy infrastructure, along with the cooling system, incurs a capital expense (CapEx) of US $10-25 per watt of IT critical power, amounting to a multimillion or even billion-dollar project to add new DC capacities. Therefore, scaling up energy capacity to accommodate growing DC demand is a giant challenge [6] - [8] .
Generally, recent research in DCs has addressed many of existing issues from various aspect in order to achieve optimal operation efficiency. Operation efficiency is the topmost concern to DC operators because the overall economics in delivering DC services ultimately determines their business competitiveness. The major challenge arisen from the need of operation efficiency is to provide flexible DC resource provisioning in order to accommodate the constantly changing workload requirements. Usually, resources in DCs are not used efficiently for managing on-demand services. Therefore, adopting an intelligent DC resource management mechanism is a critical issue to enhance the DC resource utilization while accommodating system efficiency. However, achieving these goals is difficult in the distributed DC infrastructure whereas users and cluster agents are free to act in a selfish manner. Therefore, we need a new control paradigm to address the DC resource allocation problem [9] .
Game Theory is concerned with decision making in strategic settings that describes and analyzes interactive decision situations. It is used to predict the outcome of complex interaction among rational players, and attempts to mathematically capture behaviors in strategic situations. In some game situations, it is possible and fruitful to cooperate with other game players. Where players can make binding agreements with each other, and there is some added value available by cooperating with others, then it can make sense for players to work together to mutual advantage [10] . In this paper, we focus on cooperative game models for the DC resource allocation problem.
Motivated by the above discussion, we design a novel DC resource allocation scheme based on the cooperative game solutions. Proactively, we adaptively assign the workload among different servers to maximize the DC system efficiency. By adopting the concept of relative utilitarian bargaining solution, the workload is adaptively distributed considering the relative thermal condition. Reactively, we maintain a thermal equilibrium to reduce the cooling cost. According to the main idea of τ -value, the cooling energy is dynamically exploited to preserve the thermal stability. Based on the interactive mechanism between proactive and reactive processes, our dual-level cooperative game model makes control decisions to achieve a globally desirable system performance while maximizing the DC's operation profits. From a cooperative game perspective, our solution exhibits a number of interesting axiomatic properties. In this study, our key contributions are summarized in the following: i) we design a new cooperative game model to investigate the DC resource allocation problem. Based on the dual-level game structure, we strike an appropriate performance in terms of load balancing and energy consumption. ii) proactively, we develop a relative utilitarian bargaining game model to adaptively assign the working load among different DC servers. The proposed game model is designed as a thermal-aware utilitarian approach while considering the resource efficiency. iii) reactively, we explore the idea of τ -value to effectively manipulate the cooling energy. According to the axioms of τ -value, our approach can provide a fairefficient solution. iv) we design the sequential interaction of proactive and reactive processes, and jointly implement a dual-level game process. The synergy effect lies in its responsiveness to the reciprocal combination of two different solutions. v) we justify the advantages of the proposed approach with extensive simulations. To confirm the superiority of our protocol, we compare our scheme with existing state-of-the art DC resource allocation protocols. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review the related work in Section II. In Section III, we describe the DC system infrastructure, and give some preliminaries about the relative utilitarian bargaining solution and τ -value. Using these solution concepts, the DC resource allocation problem is formulated as a dual-level game model. And then, the proposed scheme is presented in detail. In Section IV, we present simulation results to validate the effectiveness of our game based approach by comparing with existing protocols. Finally, we provide our conclusions, and topics of future research work are discussed in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
The increasing energy consumption of DCs will cause severe economic, ecological, environmental, and technical problems. To develop high-performance and energy-efficient DCs, resource control schemes for DCs have gained increasing interest and importance.
The literatures [19] - [21] represent the DC control issues based on the blockchain technology. In paper [19] , C. Xu et al study the distrust issues of big data sharing in collaborative edges. Especially, they develop a green blockchain framework for big data sharing in collaborative edges, VOLUME 7, 2019 considering the challenging issues arose from the properties of edge computing. And then, a novel transaction theory has been developed; it shows the former transaction, whose outputs are all referenced by the latter transactions, is useless for the validation of newly generated transaction. Finally, Express Transactions (E-TX) and Hollow Blocks are proposed to enhance the network efficiency of the proposed framework. The smart contract based E-TX is designed for supporting the asynchronous validation of transaction. Moreover, Hollow Block which can significantly reduce redundancy in block propagation is proposed to further enhance the network resource efficiency [19] .
The study in [20] takes the first step to survey the cluster frameworks and scheduling strategies in DC networks. Especially, it provides a detailed discussion of recent achievements in algorithms. Moreover, by providing a review and giving a comparison in different metrics, it can straighten out the development course of existing frameworks. And then this study uses coordination principles, e.g., data distribution, prior knowledge and control scheme, for scheduling strategy analysis to help readers understand the research progress of cluster frameworks. Finally, mechanisms for conquering crucial challenges in DC networks are discussed, including providing low latency and minimizing job completion time while analyzing desirable properties of fault tolerance and scalability to illuminate the design principles of distributed systems [20] .
C. Xu, K. Wang and M. Guo study an intelligent energy-aware resource management problem in cloud DCs. Specifically, they consider a series of requests, each of which requires an amount of computational resources to run its virtual machines. Main objective is to minimize the total cost of energy consumption from request scheduling and request migration among DCs. And then they propose a blockchain-based decentralized resource management framework to save the energy cost by scheduler that exists in most traditional models. The malfunctioning of one DC will not affect the continued resource management, which brings superior robustness to the framework. To minimize the total cost of request migration among DCs, they implement reinforcement learning based request migration method by a smart contract in our framework. It is the first attempt for reinforcement learning to be embedded into the smart contract for solving the energy cost minimization problem [21] . Even though the studies in [19] - [21] introduce new control concepts related to the blockchain technology, these ideas do not consider the thermal-aware resource allocation approach.
The Stackelberg Game based Resource Allocation (SGRA) scheme [4] employs game theoretic approaches to model the problem of minimizing DC energy consumption as the Stackelberg game. In the game model of the SGRA scheme, the system monitor plays the role of the leader and can maximize its profit by adjusting resource provisioning. Especially, the leader determines which resources to switch on or off while simultaneously ensuring the acceptable quality of service (QoS). Multiple scheduler agents act as followers, and can select resources to obtain optimal performance; they compete with one another in the sharing resources. This game approach can help obtain an in-depth analytical understanding of the service provisioning problem of DCs. Given the decentralized characteristics of Stackelberg game model, the self-organizing feature of scheduler agents can be added automatically into DCs. Consequently, the heavy burden of complex centralized management can be alleviated. The SGRA scheme has a relatively low complexity and the characteristic of distributed execution. Therefore, this approach can be easily implemented to improve the reliability and robustness of DC system [4] .
The Holistic Total Energy Minimization (HTEM) scheme [6] addresses an in-depth model capturing the operational and thermal characteristics of DCs. According to this study, workload scheduling by combining server status and DC thermal characteristics is an effective way to reduce total energy consumption. The HTEM scheme forms the foundation to propose a greedy-based task scheduling algorithm, which comprises two separated components. One is an initial placement component, and the other is a dynamic task migration component. The main goal of task migration component is to reduce the total energy cost of cooling and computation while ensuring the QoS. The HTEM scheme captures cooling, DC thermal characteristics, CPU temperature and workload in a fine-grained manner. Therefore, this approach can be used by researchers in order to evaluate DC thermal operations in numerous configurations. In addition, cooling temperature can be effectively modeled by exponential function corroborating [6] .
The Proactive Thermal-aware Resource Control (PTRC) scheme [11] introduces a novel notion of heat imbalance and validates a simple robust heat-imbalance model, which helps predict future temperature trends and makes proactive resource provisioning and migration decisions. And then, the thermal-aware proactive virtual machine mapping solution is proposed. The capability to migrate virtual machines away from lightly-loaded servers in a thermal-aware manner opens up opportunity to improve resource consolidation over time. This innovative proactive thermal-aware virtual machine consolidation technique maximizes computing resource utilization, minimizes DC energy consumption, and improves the efficiency of heat extraction, while not violating the recommended temperature. Therefore, the PTRC scheme can achieve the greater resource consolidation over time while taking into account the following key tradeoffs: energy savings vs. delay and network overhead [11] .
The SGRA scheme [4] , the HTEM scheme [6] and the PTRC scheme [11] have introduced unique challenges to efficiently solve the DC resource allocation problem, and have attracted a lot of attentions, recently. In summary, they are valuable to integrate the characteristics of DC system and thermal-aware control features. In particular, the SGRA scheme used game theory as an enabling tool to make control decisions while maximizing the DC energy efficiency. While the existing schemes in [4] , [6] , [11] and our proposed scheme have some similarities, there is a major difference. None of the existing schemes explore the cooperative game approach. On the contrary to the existing schemes, we consider a new dual-level cooperative game model to handle the thermal-aware resource allocation problem in DC operations. Compared to these existing schemes in [4] , [6] , [11] , we demonstrate the superiority of our approach through the simulation analysis.
III. PROPOSED THERMAL-AWARE RESOURCE ALLOCATION SCHEME
In this section, we present a novel thermal-aware DC resource allocation scheme. First, we introduce the infrastructure of DC system, and explain the main ideas of relative utilitarian bargaining solution and τ -value. And then, we develop the DC resource allocation scheme based on the dual-level cooperative game model. Finally, we describe concretely the proposed scheme in the eight-step procedures.
A. THE DC SYSTEM INFRASTRUCTURE
In this study, we consider a DC infrastructure, which consists of multiple server zones z = {z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z n }. Each zone is composed of multiple server units with identical hardware configuration; they are arranged into rows of racks. The computer room air handling (CRAH) unit cools each zone where the CRAH C i ∈ C = {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n } cools its associated zone z i by using chiller, cooling tower and pumps that control the water flow. Scheduler S i ∈ S = {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n } monitors the workload and thermal conditions of z 1≤i≤n , which is its corresponding zone. Each individual scheduler schedules its working load while controlling the CRAH based on the thermal awareness, which is the knowledge of temperature imbalance at different zones inside the DC. The concept of thermal awareness is essential to maximize the energy and cooling efficiency as well as to minimize server system failure rate [4] , [11] .
With the preceding classification, we describe the behaviors of DC while capturing internal states of system components in a simplified practical manner. In this study, we model the DC system using the interactive relationship between schedulers. Each individual scheduler has an ability to monitor its corresponding zone, and provides a more adaptive control mechanism in an interactive feedback manner. When users send applications to DC central controller for the task processing, the controller decides which scheduler will process each task while optimizing the system performance. We assume that there are different kinds of application tasks; they have various workload requirements. For the processing of each application task, virtual machine (VM) is created; it is provisioned with DC resources that satisfy the application's requirement. Once a VM is provisioned, it has to be allocated to servers housed within rack in the DC. This VM allocation process is operated by the selected scheduler, which is also responsible for monitoring its corresponding server zone. With the current working condition, schedulers also consider the thermal awareness for the DC resource allocation problem. Table 1 lists the notations used in this paper. We can calculate the power of DC server consumption. Usually, the power consumed by servers is equal to the ratio of the amount of heat generated by servers. Therefore, it provides us with the direct relation between the subsystem utilization and heat dissipation. Servers can potentially transition between on and idle states. At least one server in a rack is on state, the other servers in the same rack are idle states. Apart from the off state, the idle state is an actual energy-saving state until a wake-up event occurs [11] . In this study, we provide a time-driven DC management paradigm. To implement this paradigm, we partition the time axis into equal intervals of length unit_time ( t ). Based on the power management functionality, we can define the power consumption (P S ) of server S. 
where P on S and P idle S are the full energy and minimum energy consumptions for the server S, respectively. M S is the total computation capacity of the S. t on S , t idle S and t off S are the server S's on, idle and off time periods during the t , respectively. ξ and β are control parameters to estimate the Q S value. VOLUME 7, 2019 In the time interval [t 0 , t 0 + t ], the heat-generation H S i of the S i 's covering zone, which provides servers to host a set of VMs, is defined as follows;
where S S i is the set of servers associated with the S i , and γ S is the heat dissipation factor. During the DC operations, servers at tremendously high workload rates get exceptionally hot. Therefore, having proper temperature management is absolutely vital to maintain the functionality of the DC equipment. In addition, due to the skewed temperature distribution among zones, sophisticated cooling system needs to be applied for the servers in hot zones to continue working without overheating. As energy consumption by cooling DCs can be over 40% of total energy consumption, DC energy usage can be categorized as stemming from computing and cooling. Therefore, efficient cooling system plays an essential role for reducing the DC operation cost [6] . Traditionally, task scheduling algorithm involves consolidating workloads into fewer servers. But, it results in increased likelihood of high temperature hot spots needing additional cooling energy for removal. Therefore, the problems of minimizing cooling energy and the highest server temperature are shown to be equivalent; minimizing cooling energy entails workload balancing [6] . In a dynamic and holistic manner, we develop a novel cooling model to capture thermal features of CRAH units. To design our cooling energy control algorithm, we explicitly take account of CRAH units as the only cooling devices since they account for the most cooling energy. The total energy E C i consumed by the CRAH unit C i comprises air compression energy and fan energy. The power consumption of a fan unit E f is proportional to the cubic of its rotation speed, and the energy consumption is obtained by time integral of the power. The air compression energy is defined considering the removed heat (R H ) by the CRAH unit and the energy consumption function P T sup with the demanding air temperature T sup . With the current time temperature T t c , the
given by [6] ;
where S z is the size coefficient factor of cooling zone z and E z is the fanning energy factor. µ and κ are control parameters for the energy consumption function. Therefore, the total energy TE
consumed by the DC system during the [t c , t c + t ] is defined as follows;
B. THE MAIN CONCEPT OF RELATIVE UTILITARIAN BARGAINING SOLUTION
A bargaining situation involves individual game players who have the opportunity to collaborate for mutual benefit in more than one way. Let I be a finite set of players, and let A be a set of social outcomes, i.e., allocations of limited resources. R + denotes the set of non-negative real numbers and let R I + is convex, compact, and comprehensive, and q ∈ B. The problem is to choose some point in B F q as the social outcome. A bargaining solution is a function σ : B → R I + such that, for all (B, q) ∈ B; i) σ (B, q) ∈ B, and ii) σ (B, q) ≥ q. These conditions reflect the fact that a bargain requires unanimous consent. This distinguishes bargaining solutions from social choice functions, which do not posit a status quo point. The classical utilitarian bargaining solution ϒ : B → R I + is defined [12] ;
More broadly construed as a social choice function, classic utilitarianism has several philosophically appealing axiomatic characterizations. However, classical utilitarian bargaining solution implicitly assumes that utility functions are interpersonally comparable, which is unjustified in the bargaining problem. By applying affine-transformations to the utility functions {u i } i∈I , we can reshape the bargaining problem (B, q), thereby changing the outcome of ϒ (B, q). In this way, the ϒ (B, q) can be easily manipulated by the bargainers in I. Therefore, any meaningful bargaining solution must be rescaling invariant under any affine transformations of the utility functions {u i } i∈I ; no player can manipulate the outcome of σ by applying an affine transformation to his utility function [12] .
One way to achieve rescaling invariant is to renormalize the functions {u i } i∈I to each range from zero to one, and then apply the classic utilitarian solution to this renormalized problem; this yields the relative utilitarian bargaining solution (RUBS) Given a bargaining problem, the RUBS maximizes the sum total of the players' utilities. Formally, let (B, q) be a bargaining problem on I. For every i ∈ I, we can define the renormalized joint utility function U (B,q) as follows;
The RUBSΥ(B, q) is the point in B F q which maximizes the value of U (B,q) . Clearly,Υ(B, q) is rescaling invariant, and it is a variant of utilitarianism which obviates the problem of interpersonal utility comparison by effectively legislating that each player's status quo utility is morally equivalent to every other player's status quo utility [12] .
C. THE BASIC IDEA OF τ -VALUE
To define the basic idea of τ -value, we start with some preliminary notations. Let (N , ν) be a cooperative game in characteristic function form where N = {1, 2, . . . , n is a set of players and the characteristic function v : 2 N → R. Each subset of players, i.e., S ⊆ N , is a coalition, and the function v is a real valued function that assigns each coalition to its value ν(S) with ν(∅) = 0. Therefore, ν(S) denotes the value or the worth of the coalition S, and G N is the set of all games with the N and ν(S) where S ∈ 2 N . If a game changes so that some player's contribution to all coalitions increases or stays the same, then the player's allocation should not decrease. For cooperative games, this principle is monotonicity. In this study, we will restrict our attention to a subset of G N consisting of all monotonic games. This set is denoted by MG N . So, ν (·) ∈ MG N if and only if ν (S) ≤ ν(T ) whenever S ⊆ T . Since ν (∅) = 0, this implies that ν (S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊆ N [13] .
Recently, the big boss game has received much attention in cooperative game theory and it turns out that there are many economic situations, which give rise to big boss games; one seller-many buyers situations of certain type, landlordworkers games with a concave production function, and bankruptcy games with one big claimant. Let ν (·) be a game in MG N . ν (·) is called a big boss game if there is one player who is a big boss, denoted by i * ∈ N , satisfying the following two conditions [13] , [14] .
C1 implies that the big boss i * is very powerful, i.e., coalitions not containing i * cannot get anything. In other words, there is no gain by cooperation if the big boss is not included in the coalition. C2 implies that for a union, i.e., every coalition not containing i * , its contribution to the grand coalition is not less than the sum of the contributions of its players to the grand coalition. In other words, for a union, the marginal contribution to the grand coalition is at least as large as the sum of the marginal contributions of each of its members. Hence, the weak players may increase their influences by forming coalitions. We can notice that a big boss game ν (·) is superadditive, i.e., ν (S)+ν (T ) ≤ ν(S ∪T ) whenever S ∩T = ∅, because of the monotonicity of ν (·) and clan property [13] .
In 1981, S.H. Tijs introduced the concept of τ -value, which is a well-known solution concept for big boss games. Before starting the analysis, we briefly review their definitions. The basic idea of τ -value is that the dividend given to each player is proportional to the marginal contribution of that player to the grand coalition. To define the τ -value, we consider a cooperative game with ν (·) [15] .
is the player i's marginal contribution to the grand coalition, and let M (ν) = (M i (ν)) i∈N . For each player i ∈ N and each coalition S ⊆ N , we assume that the player i obtains the remaining payoff (R (S, i) ) while paying the other players' idealistic payoffs [13] - [15] .
where R (S, i) is the remainder for the player i in coalition S. As opposed to the concept of idealistic payoff, R (S, i) is a lower bound for the player i's dividend in the grand coalition. If the player i is rational, he can select a specific coalition with the maximal remainder (m i (ν)) for him among all possible coalitions. The payoff for the player i in such a coalition is called the minimal right. According to the m i (ν), we can define the minimal right vector (m (ν)) is given by [13] - [15] .
The τ -value (τ (ν)) characterizes unique mapping τ (ν) = (τ 1 (ν) , τ 2 (ν) . . . τ n (ν)) where τ i (ν) is the payoff given to the player i. Formally, the τ -value is given based on the convex combination of M (ν) and m (ν)
The τ -value possess a symmetry property in the sense that if the players i, j are symmetric in the big boss game ν (·). Here, two players i, j ∈ N are said to be symmetric in the game ν (·) if ν S {i} = ν S {j} for all S ⊆ N − {i, j} [13] .
D. THE DUAL-LEVEL GAME BASED DC RESOURCE ALLOCATION SCHEME
To effectively control the DC system, we need to predict the future resource needs. In this study, we adopt the Fast Up and Slow Down (FUSD) algorithm based on the past external behaviors of system components [16] . Usually, the exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) estimation formula applies a non-uniform weighting to time series data, so that a lot of data can be used, but recent data is weighted more heavily. As the name suggests, weights are based upon the exponential function by using the control parameter α. Although the EWMA formula is seemingly satisfactory, this formula does not capture the rising trends of resource usage. To reflect the acceleration, the FUSD algorithm takes an innovative approach by setting α to a negative value. When −1 ≤ α < 0, the EWMA formula can be transformed into the following [16] :
where Q (t c ) and W (t c ) are the estimated and the observed resource usages at time t c , respectively. α reflects a tradeoff between stability and responsiveness. When the observed resource usage is going down, we want to be conservative in reducing the estimation value. Hence, we use two parameters, α up and α down , to control how quickly Q (t c ) adapts to changes when the W (t c ) is increasing or decreasing, respectively; it is the FUSD algorithm [16] . When a new task ψ k is arrived, it should be assigned a specific scheduler S. In our proposed scheme, we design a novel task scheduling algorithm based on the RUBS. From a commonsense standpoint, the RUBS can be interpreted as a compromise solution between the egalitarian solution and the utilitarian solution [12] . Based on the utility of each individual scheduler, the DC controller selects the most adaptable scheduler to execute the ψ k . According to the Q (t c ), we can formulate the utility functions of scheduler. To quantify service payoffs with the new task ψ k , the utility function of scheduler S i at time t c U z on TE 
, C ≤ C. In this study, the τ -value is adopted to design the bankruptcy rule f . In our algorithm, the c z i is defined based on the TE For ( ; ; ) { IFa new task ψ is arrived for the DC at time t c , { assigned a specific scheduler S based on the RUBS; { Q (t c ) of each S is estimated using (11); U t S (·) of each S is given by (12); ψ is assigned to a specific S using (13); } } Periodically, T sup is estimated according to (14) ; Each C estimates the cooling energy for the next t ; { H S value is calculated using (2); each C calculates the E C i according to (3) ; TE
C is given by (4); } m (ν) is obtained using (16)- (18); Using the idea of τ -value, the TE C is divided for each cooling zone according to (19) ; Each individual agent is self-monitoring, and parameters are dynamically updated in an online manner; } one DC controller and four schedulers; each scheduler can be a sub-controller and has four sub-schedulers, recursively.
• We assume a three level DC system infrastructure, and the lowest level scheduler controls the twelve servers in its corresponding rack.
• In order to represent application tasks, six different type applications -I, II, III, IV, V and VI -are assumed. Application tasks are randomly generated from these six types.
• Application tasks have different computation requirements. During the duration of each task, computation requirement can be dynamically changeable. If it increases, it is increasing exponentially. However, if it decreases, it is decreasing polynomially.
• The arrival process for offered number of applications (task generation rate) is Poisson process (ρ). The offered rate range is varied from 0 to 3.
• Total computing capacity (M S ) of each server is 10 GHz. • All temperatures such as T sup , T t c , T th and T red are normalized values.
• The DC system performance measures obtained on the basis of 100 simulation runs are plotted as functions of the offered workload (ρ). According to the simulation metrics, the performance is evaluated mainly to demonstrate the validity of the proposed approach. The simulation parameters are presented in Table I . Each parameter has its own characteristics.
In Figure 1 , energy consumption ratio for computations at each task generation rate is reported. As the task generation rate gets higher, the relative performance of our proposed scheme improves. This is because when workload is increased, managing it intelligently can lead to substantial performance gains. By taking into account the online thermal information, we adaptively assign the working load among different DC servers based on the concept of RUBS. Therefore, our thermal-aware utilitarian approach can satisfy the desirable requirement of each application task while achieving the computation cost saving. The simulation results in Figure 1 can be interpreted as our proposed scheme strategically exploits the limited DC's resource to ensure a higher system efficiency, which represents a lower energy consumption ratio for computations. utilization in all cases. It is intuitively correct. As can be observed, the performance trend of all protocols is similar. However, it can be observed that our proposed scheme holds significant dominance in the cooling energy consumption than the existing protocols. The reason for the aforesaid is that we exploit reactively the cooling energy based on the τ -value concept. According to the axioms of τ -value, we can provide a fair-efficient solution for the energy resource allocation problem with the increase of task generation rate. Due to this reason, we can reduce the cooling energy consumption from low to high offered application load intensities. Figure 3 depicts the fairness of the working servers in the DC system. Fairness is a prominent issue to operate the computation intensive applications. If the concept of fairness is not considered explicitly at the design stage of control algorithms, it can result in very unfair working load distribution among servers. To characterize the fairness notion, we follow the Harmony-in-Gradation index [18] , which has been recently used to measure the fairness for the system resource allocation problem. In the proposed scheme, we adopt the basic idea of dual-level cooperative game solutions, and distribute the application tasks fairly. Therefore, in our proposed scheme, the actual outcome is fairly dealt out compared to the existing schemes. The simulation results displayed in Figure 1 to Figure 3 justify the advantages of the proposed approach. By the reciprocal combination of RUBS and τ -value, we jointly design an interactive dual-level game model to strike an appropriate performance efficiency; conversely, the SGRA, HTEM and PTRC schemes cannot offer such an attractive outcome under widely different application load intensities.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The past decade witnessed the tremendous growth of big data based cloud services and applications. They are usually highly complex and computational intensive, and generally performed in parallel in DCs. As the factories of the digital age, DCs are the backbone of today's IT infrastructure. However, we experience physical limitations on the power needed to run the today's CDs, which are subject to total power consumption and thermal constraints. In this study, we have addressed the DC resource allocation problem by considering the synergy of the performance and energy efficiency. Based on the dual-level cooperative game paradigm, we formulate the task scheduling and cooling system control algorithms to improve energy efficiency. Our proactive-reactive combined approach focuses on the synergistic effect of different kinds of energy consumption. Proactively, we assign application tasks to minimize the computing power based on the RUBS. Reactively, we maintain a thermal equilibrium according to the τ -value idea. The proposed dual-level game approach preserves the advantages of traditional cooperative game model where DC agents can act collectively based on binding agreements. Finally, we conduct simulations to show the effectiveness of our proposed scheme in terms of energy efficiency and load balancing in the DC system.
For the future study, there will be different open issues and practical challenges. First, we will investigate the variation in seasonal temperature, day-time versus night-time workload demand, electricity tariffs, and the interconnection of global DCs. Second, time-varying modeling and learningbased resource profiling are required in order to apply our solution. Third, we assume that there is always enough memory to run all the tasks assigned to DC servers. One way this work can be extended is to take into account memory limitations. Last, we are keen to implement our protocol to real test-bed and analyze the system performance, which is hopeful to achieve valuable experience for practitioners.
